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A cap on bankers’ bonuses is needed to limit excessive risk
taking and the associated costs to the taxpayer.
by Blog Admin
A provisional EU agreement has been reached on the principle of capping bonuses in the
European banking industry. Sony Kapoor and Philippe Lamberts present a case in favour
of such a cap, arguing that the current skewed incentives faced by bankers drive excessive
risk-taking, which ultimately has to be paid for by taxpayers.
The European Parliament is right to limit the maximum bonus bankers can command as a
proportion of  base salary. This will help tackle the culture of  excessive risk-taking and the
bending of  rules that has now become endemic to banking. Undertaking this at an EU-wide
level will also limit any large-scale migration of  the so-called ‘talent’, an argument of ten
advanced by the opponents of  bonus caps. More importantly, it will reduce the risks borne
by tax-payers and go a long way toward rehabilitating the industry, f orcing it to f ocus on
serving the real economy again.
Whatever one might think of  base salary levels in f inance, it is the possibility of  large
bonuses that has been a major driver of  many of  the most pernicious problems in banking.
The risk-reward landscape f aced by bankers is highly skewed. Traders and deal-makers, in particular, can
earn multiples of  base salary on the upside. Retail banking has also seen a prolif eration of  perf ormance-
linked pay, where selling large volumes of  products, such as payment protection insurance, is highly
rewarded. The downside, if  things go wrong, is limited to getting f ired and losing one’s salary. Criminal
prosecution and prison, no matter what the degree of  malf easance or irresponsibility, remain an exception.
The costs of  things going wrong are of ten borne by taxpayers.
These skewed incentives drive excessive
risk-taking among traders, promoting
marginal and sometimes “value-
destroying” mergers and acquisit ions by
investment bankers, and the sale of
inappropriate f inancial products by retail
bankers. All else being equal, larger, riskier
trades, bigger mergers and higher volumes
of  products sold are more prof itable. As
the Libor scandal, the widespread mis-
selling of  f inancial products and support
f or dubious tax-evading activit ies all show,
the starry-eyed pursuit of  ever- larger
bonuses also drives bankers to cut
corners with the law. As a consequence,
the f inancial system ends up being larger,
more complex and has more f requent transactions than is socially optimal or f inancially necessary to
support the real economy. Rent seeking at an individual level by bankers, where they can pocket the gains
and impose losses on taxpayers and thus the rest of  society, is ref lected at an aggregate level by a
banking system that has become prone to parasit ic rent-seeking.
Controlling bonuses f or eventual losses is not enough (the so-called claw-backs), because risks will only
sometimes materialise into losses, particularly if  bankers load up on low probability, high impact systemic
risks. When such risks materialise, as they did in 2008, the whole banking system then needs to be propped
up, or the economy f aces collapse. The bending of  rules at institutions also of ten goes undetected. In
most years, bankers will be heavily rewarded f or behaviour that at the outset is harmf ul f or the whole of
society.
Linking pay-outs to the risk f aced by the f irm will not work either, as even the largest traders will only
account f or a f raction of  the f irm’s overall risk. The sensit ivity of  bonuses to prof it attributable to a banker
remains much larger than to any increase in f irm-level risk. It remains entirely rational to load up on risk, no
matter if  one gets paid in coco / bail- in bonds. Paying bankers in shares or options can actually be
counterproductive as such packages f urther increase the asymmetry between the good and bad states of
the world. The downside of  shares or options is limited whereas the prof it potential is enormous. Payment
in share options has been known to get executives even more f ocused on short term gains, even when it
comes at the cost of  long-term pains.
In f act, there are only two ways to address the heavily skewed incentive structure bankers f ace: by
increasing downside risks f aced by individuals or by limiting rewards. Since we are not about to start
hanging bankers, the excessive risk taking that is endemic to the f inancial system can only be tackled by
capping rewards.
Bonuses supposedly reward ef f ort or ability, but are usually based on outcomes, because these are easier
to measure. A reasonable case can be made f or rewarding ef f ort with prof it- linked pay in the real economy.
The longer a good dentist works, the more income he can generate, but there are only 24 hours in the day.
In f inance, the link between ef f ort and prof it is much less robust than in dentistry or manuf acturing. Bigger
or riskier trades can generate much higher prof its, but the link to additional ef f ort is weak. Should activit ies
that bend rules to generate higher prof its be rewarded in proportion to these prof its? Banking is “scalable”,
like creative prof essions such as writ ing or acting. In these areas, a relatively small personal ef f ort can
generate huge prof its: JK Rowling, the creator of  Harry Potter, is now a billionaire.
However, there are three important distinctions between such creative prof essions and banking. The
average author and the average actor are poor, while the average banker is not. Writers have to be
exceptionally talented or exceptionally lucky to make it, bankers do not. Reading Harry Potter or watching
Tom Cruise (personal taste aside) adds to the lives of  millions of  people (at least it does not make them
miserable and you are f ree not to engage). Problems in Banking, on the other hand, can and do pose an
existential threat to whole societies, irrespective of  our individual choices.
Additional considerations of  f airness only add to what is already otherwise a very sound stability case f or
imposing bonus caps on bankers. This would also produce subsidiary benef its of  a banking system that is
simpler, smaller and more ethical, support f or which has snowballed since the f inancial crisis.
Note: This is the original longer version of an Opinion Piece arguing for imposing caps on banker bonuses that
appeared in the Guardian newspaper on the 25th of Feb 2013.
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